BYU Law Review
Volume 1992 | Issue 4

Article 10

11-1-1992

State v. Perank: Is the Uintah-Ouray Reservation
''Nailed Down Upon the Border"?
David R. Williams

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons
Recommended Citation
David R. Williams, State v. Perank: Is the Uintah-Ouray Reservation ''Nailed Down Upon the Border"?, 1992 BYU L. Rev. 1247 (1992).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1992/iss4/10

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

State v. Perank:' Is the Uintah-Ouray
Reservation "Nailed Down Upon the order"?^

Part of the Uintah-Ouray Reservation in northeastern
Utah was opened for non-Indian settlement in 1905. In 1985
the Tenth Circuit ruled that the boundaries of this reservation
were not changed by the acts which made tribal lands available
for sale to non-Indian settler^.^ In contrast, in 1992 the Utah
Supreme Court held that the reservation boundaries had been
diminished by these acts and that a state trial court had criminal jurisdiction over a crime committed by an Indian on nonIndian land within the original boundaries of the r e s e ~ a t i o n . ~
This note examines the Utah Supreme Court decision in
State u. Perank. Part I1 provides a brief historical background
of the federal government's policy regarding allotment of tribal
lands and also summarizes the Tenth Circuit's 1985 decision.

1. Editor's note: On November 25, 1992, the Utah Supreme Court ordered that
an "issuance of remittitur [in State v. Perank], be stayed pending (1) the conclusion
of any proceedings on certiorari in the United States Supreme Court in [State v.
Perank] or State v. Hagen, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 ([I July 17, 1992), and (2) the
final disposition of the injunction proceeding pending in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah, Ute Indian Tribe u. State of Utah, et al., Civil No.
C75-408." As of the date of publication, Perank has not been published in the
official reporter. Although the opinion is subject to revision prior to final
publication, the Editors have determined to publish this note because the question
of whether the Uintah-Ouray Reservation was diminished is timely and because
the general analysis regarding diminishment of reservations is pertinent and
meaninghl.
2.
In 1903, Bureau of Indian Affairs Inspector James McLaughlin solicited the
consent of the Ute Indians to allotment of tribal lands. He explained to the
Indians:
You say that line is very heavy and that the reservation is nailed down
upon the border. That is very true as applying to the past many years
and up to now, but Congress has provided legislation which will pull u p
the nails which hold down that line and after next year there will be no
outside boundary line to this reservation.
Minutes of Councils Held by James McLaughlin, U.S. Indian Inspector, with the
Utah and White River Ute Indians a t Uintah Agency, Utah 42 (May 18-23, 1903),
quoted in State v. Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 12 (July 17, 1992).
3.
Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986).
4.
State v. Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 18 (July 17, 1992).
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Part I11 gives a synopsis of Perank's facts and examines the
court's reasoning. Part IV analyzes the decision by using the
analytical structure set forth by the Supreme Court in Solem u.
~ a r t l e t tand
~ by focusing on the differences between Perank
and the Tenth Circuit decision. This note concludes that the
Perank decision was correct because the express language of
the statutes which opened the Uintah Reservation for nonIndian settlement demonstrates congressional intent to diminish the reservation boundaries and because the disputed lands
have lost their Indian character.

A. The Allotment Policy
Federal Indian policy shifted significantly in the latter part
of the nineteenth centuqc6 In 1887 the federal government
turned away from its prior policy of communally owned tribal
reservations and adopted a policy of allotting separate parcels
of tribally held lands to individual members. The concept underlying this policy was "to lure the nomadic tribes away from
their communal village existence and to encourage a sedentary,
rural agricultural life on separate allotments."' Congress
passed several pieces of legislation in support of this policy
which opened specific reservations for allotment and made the
surplus lands available to non-Indian settlers.'
The failure of Congress to dictate precise boundary chang-

5.
465 U.S. 463 (1984).
See ROBERTN. CLINTONET AL., AMERICANINDIAN LAW 147-52 (3d ed.
6.
1991).
Id. a t 148. The General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act) authorized the
7.
President to allot parcels of reservation lands to Indians and to sell the unallotted
lands to non-Indians. 25 U.S.C. 8 331 (1988). "In view of the discretionary nature
of this presidential power, Congress occasionally enacted special legislation in order
to assure that a particular reservation was in fact opened to allotment." Mattz v.
Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 497 (1973). The openings of specific reservations for allotment were governed by 108' separate pieces of legislation.
Some of the acts provided for the outright cession of the unallotted lands;
some provided for a cession in trust; some provided that the unallotted
lands would be "restored to the public domain" or to status as "public
lands;" other acts simply provided that the unallotted lands would be
opened for settlement . . . .
Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1152 (D. Utah 1981) (citations omitted).
8.
See, e-g., Act,of May 30, 1910, ch. 260, 36 Stat. 448; Act of May 29, 1908,
ch. 218, 35 Stat. 460; Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 1035.
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es as it opened the various reservations has created a modern
jurisdictional q ~ a n d a r y .State
~
courts have limited criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country.1° If a crime is committed by or
against an Indian in Indian country, jurisdiction is federal or
tribal." The only time that a state clearly has jurisdiction
over a crime committed in Indian country is when both the
defendant and the victim are non-Indians? Thus, knowing
the boundaries of Indian country is essential to resolving any
criminal jurisdictional issue.
Since 1948, "Indian country" has been defined by statute
as "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under
the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent."13 Whether land constitutes Indian country under this definition turns on whether it
is located within the boundaries of an Indian reservation.
Moreover, once established, a reservation remains Indian country until it is terminated by Congress; the mere sale of reservation land to non-Indians does not remove the land from the
reservation for jurisdictional purposes.14 As a result, modern
Congress did not focus on the precise boundaries of the reservations which
9.
were opened for allotment because it was commonly assumed that all reservations
would be abolished as the culmination of the allotment policy. See Rosebud Sioux
Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 624-25 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). During the
time the allotment policy was being implemented, Indian country as a jurisdictional
concept was defined as including only lands held under Indian title. See, eg., Bates
v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 208 (1877). This title-dependent definition was later expanded to include all lands within the boundaries of an Indian reservation regardless of
title. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 468 (1984).
Congress has granted certain states, including Kansas, North Dakota and
10.
Iowa, concurrent criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations. See Negonsott v.
Samuels, 6 1 U.S.L.W. 4185, 4186 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1993).
11. 18 U.S.C. $8 1152-1153 (1988).
12.
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881); see generally FELIX
S. COHEN'SHANDBOOKOF FEDERALINDIANLAW34-38, 286-304, 335-41 (Rennard
Strickland et al. eds., 1982); Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian
Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARE. L. REV. 503 (1976).
18 U.S.C. $ 1151(a) (1988). A patent is the instrument by which the federal
13.
government grants public lands to an individual. BLACK'SLAW DICTIONARY1125
(6th ed. 1990). The statute also defines Indian country as "all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States . . . , and . . . all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-ofway running through the same." 18 U.S.C. 5 1151(b)-(c) (1988).
Clinton, supra note 12, a t 513. The question has frequently arisen whether
14.
a n act of Congress which opened reservation land for sale to non-Indians has diminished the boundaries of a reservation, thereby removing the land from Indian
country for jurisdictional purposes. See, eg., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984);
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U S . 584 (1977); DeCoteau v. District County
Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); Seymour v. Su-
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criminal jurisdictional questions are resolved by determining
whether Congress intended to reduce or diminish a reservation's boundaries by passing a particular act, even though a t
the time the distinction seemed unimportant.15 Thus, the
terms of the statutes which opened the particular reservation
for settlement must be examined to determine whether Congress intended to diminish the reservation boundaries.

B. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah1'
In 1975 the Ute Indian Tribe enacted and published a Law
and Order Code which purported to exercise jurisdiction over
all lands within the Uintah and Uncompahgre Reservations as
they were originally created." Several municipalities and one
county located within the original Uintah Reservation and the
State of Utah protested, and the Ute Tribe sued for declaratory
and injunctive relief to determine the present extent of tribal
jurisdicti~n.'~
The district court ruled that the boundaries of
the Uncompahgre Reservation had been disestablished by Congress but that the boundaries of the Uintah Reservation, now
called the Uintah-Ouray Reservation, had not been diminished
by the acts of Congress which allotted tribal lands to tribal
members and opened the unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement. ''
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit &rmed the district court's
decision in part, but reversed the district court's holding that
The court
the Uncompahgre Reservation was dise~tablished.~~

perintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
Solem, 465 U.S. at 468.
15.
773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986).
16.
17.
Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1075-77 (D. Utah 1981), affd
in part & rev'd in part, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 994 (1986).
18.
Id. at 1078-79.
19.
The district court also held that the original boundaries of the Uintah Reservation were diminished by withdrawal of an area known as the Gilsonite Strip,
withdrawal of 1,010,000 acres for an addition to the adjacent national forest reserve, and withdrawal of 56,000 acres for a reclamation project. The court found
that the boundaries of the Uintah-Ouray Reservation were extended in 1948 to
include 510,000 acres known as the Hill Creek Extension. Id. a t 1153-54.
20.
Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d a t 1093. The Tenth Circuit also reversed the
district court's holding that the Uintah reservation was diminished by the withdrawal of 1,010,000 acres of forest land. Id. A previous panel decision of the Tenth
Circuit held that the unallotted lands became part of the public domain and were
not, therefore, within the boundaries of the reservation. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah,
716 F.2d 1298, 1315 (10th Cir. 1983).
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noted that disestablishment or diminishment of the reservation
would require a "clear expression of congressional intent t o
change the status of the re~ervation."~'
The court found that
only two situations would reveal such an intent: (1)when the
act opening the reservation makes explicit reference to cession,
coupled with an unconditional commitment to compensate the
tribe .for lost lands; or (2) when events surrounding passage of
the act " 'reveal a widely held, contemporaneous understanding
that the affected reservation would shrink as a result of the
proposed legislation.' "22
Reviewing the legislation which opened the Uintah Reservation, the court found that neither the language nor the surrounding circumstances were sufficiently clear to support a
finding of congressional intent to diminish the boundaries of
the Uintah Reservation. "[Iln the absence of 'substantial and
compelling evidence of a congressional intention to diminish
Indian lands,' the courts' 'traditional solicitude for the Indian
tribes' must compel a finding that 'the old reservation boundaries survived the opening.' 'a3
The Tenth Circuit also reviewed the language of the statute that opened the neighboring Uncompahgre Reservation and
concluded that "the phrase 'restore to the public domain' [was]
not the same as a congressional state of mind to disestablish"
and that the "expression 'return to the public domain' [did] not
reliably establish the clear and unequivocal evidence of
Congress' intent to change b~undaries."~~
The court reasoned
that the statutory phrase contained no explicit language of
termination nor did it include an unconditional commitment to
compensate the Indians for their lands.25
Despite the Tenth Circuit decision in Ute Indian Tribe v.
Utah, the Utah Supreme Court recently held in State v.

21.
IJte Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d a t 1088.
Id. (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 471 (1984)).
22.
23.
Id. at 1089 (quoting Solem, 465 U.S. at 472).
24.
Id. at 1092. (citation omitted).
25.
Id. The status of the Uintah-Ouray Reservation lands at the end of the
federal litigation was as follows: (1) the boundaries of the Uncompahgre Reservation remained as they had been established in 1882; (2) the original boundaries of
the Uintah Reservation were diminished by withdrawal of a 7,040 acre tract known
as the Gilsonite Strip and withdrawal of 56,000 acres for the Strawberry River
reclamation project; and (3) the reservation included all of the lands allotted to the
Indians and the lands reserved for tribal use under the 1905 Act, the surplus or
unallotted lands which were opened to non-Indian settlement and the lands set
aside for the forest reserve. Id. a t 1089.
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PerankZ6that the phrase "restore t o the public domain" as applied to the Uintah Reservation did express congressional intent to diminish the boundaries.
111. State v. Perank
During a probation revocation proceeding in a state trial
court, Clinton Perark, who had pleaded guilty to burglary,
asserted that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction
because he was an Indian and the offense had occurred in Indian country.27The trial court rejected Perank's arguments, revoked his probation, and ordered that he serve a term in the
state prison.28On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's order after determining that Myton, Utah, the
site at which the burglary occurred, lies outside the boundaries
of the Uintah-Ouray Reservation and, consequently, was not
within Indian country.29In reaching this conclusion, the Utah
Supreme Court reasoned that a 1902 congressional act-as
amended by subsequent acts in 1903, 1904 and 1905-restored
the unallotted, unreserved lands of the Uintah Reservation to
the public domain30 and "that the Reservation boundaries
were diminished by that re~toration."~~
Accordingly, the state
trial court had jurisdiction over the offense.32

-

26.
191 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (July 17, 1992).
27.
Id. at 5.
28.
Id.
29.
Id. a t 18. The court first addressed Perank's Indian status even though the
state conceded that Perank was an Indian. The court determined that ~ e r a i khad
a significant amount of Indian blood and that he had been recognized as an Indian
by both the tribe and the federal government. He was, therefore, an Indian for the
purpose of determining jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. $9 1152-1153. Id. a t 6.
30.
The Perank Court' noted that the legal status of the "trust lands" of the
Uintah Reservation (lands allotted to Indians or reserved for tribal use), the land
which was withdrawn from the Reservation and attached to the adjoining national
forest reserve, the Uncompahgre Reservation, and the land known as the Hill
Creek Extension was not a t issue in this case. "The only issue in this case . . . is
whether the unallotted and unreserved lands that were opened to entry in 1905
and not later restored to tribal ownership and jurisdiction by the 1945 'Order of
Restoration' are within the present boundaries of the Reservation." Id. a t 7.
31.
Id. at 18. Justice Zimmerman vigorously dissented from the majority opinion, arguing that the Utah Supreme Court should defer to the decision of the
Tenth Circuit under the doctrine of comity. Id. at 22-25 (Zimmerman, J., dissenting).
32.
Id. a t 18.
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A. The Statutory Scheme
A basic understanding of the statutes that led to the opening of the Uintah Reservation is essential to comprehend the
Utah Supreme Court's decision. In 1902 Congress passed an
act which provided a scheme for opening the Uintah Reservation for non-Indian ~ e t t l e m e n t This
. ~ ~ Act set October 1, 1903
as the date for allotting lands to tribal members and restoring
surplus lands to the public domain.34It required Indian consent to the allotment scheme and provided that lands opened
for settlement would be sold for $1.25 an acre, with the proceeds used for reimbursing the United States and for the benefit of the Ute Tribe.35
After learning that "the surveying necessary to make the
allotments to the Indians could not be completed and Indian
consent would not be forthcoming," Congress passed another
act that dealt with opening the re~ervation.~~
The 1903 Act
amended the 1902 Act by dispensing with the requirement of
Indian consent and changing the opening date to October 1,
1 9 0 4 . ~On
~ April 21, 1904, Congress amended the 1902 and
1903 Acts to provide for additional time t o make the allotments
and to open the surplus lands for entry.38
Congress enacted the March 3, 1905 Act in response to a
report that additional time was needed to complete the allotment process.3gThe 1905 Act set September 1, 1905 as the
new date for opening the reservation unless the President determined that it could be opened earlier; the Act also allowed
the President to set aside lands for the Uintah Forest Reserve
and for the protection of the Indians' water supply.40
After reviewing these statutes, the Utah Supreme Court
determined that "Congress intended only to amend specific

Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 245.
33.
Id. at 263.
34.
Id. at 263-64.
35.
Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11.
36.
Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 994, 32 Stai. 982, 997-98. The provision of the
37.
Act which deleted the requirement of Indian consent "was apparently based on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Lone Wolf u. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553
(1903), decided January 5 , 1903, which held that Congress could unilaterally diminish a reservation."Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11.
Act of April 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 189, 207-08.
38.
Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1048, 1069-70.
39.
40.
Id.
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aspects of the 1902, 1903, and 1904 Acts and. . . [elxcept as
specifically amended, Congress did not intend t o change the
basic features of the 1902 and 1903 act^."^' The court stated:
After enactment of the 1905 Act, the 1902 Act remained in
full force and effect with respect to (1) providing for allotments to heads of households and members of the Uintah and
White River Tribes and for the amount of acreage for each
allotment; (2) restoring the unallotted lands to the public
domain; ( 3 ) fixing the price to be paid per acre by homesteaders; (4) providing how and to whose benefit the proceeds derived from the sale of the unallotted lands were to be applied;
and (5) protecting certain mineral right^.'^

Thus, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the 1902 Act
was the basic statutory authority for opening the Uintah Reservation. The essential elements of the 1902 Act, including the
operative language restoring unallotted lands to the public
domain, remained in effect through the enactment of the 1905
ActF3

B. The Effect of the Phrase "Restore to the Public Domain"
After determining that the 1902 Act was the basic statutory authority for opening the reservation, the Perank court rePerank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. a t 13.
41.
42.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. Part of the controversy between the Tenth Circuit and Utah decisions is
43.
the determination of which act actually opened the reservation. The Tenth Circuit,
in Ute Indian Tribe, held that the terms of the Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33
Stat. 1048, alone governed the opening of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. Ute
Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087, 1089 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 994 (1986). The Tenth Circuit found that this Act, which had no restoration language, did not diminish the reservation, and that the operative language of
the Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 245, did not carry through to the opening of the reservation. Id. The Utah Supreme Court came to the contrary conclusion, holding "that as a matter of statutory construction, the 1905 Act was merely
amendatory and supplementary to the 1902 Act and therefore did not accomplish
the opening of the Reservation independent of the 1902 Act." Perank, 191 Utah
Adv. Rep. a t 10. Thus, the language which provided "that unallotted reservation
lands would be 'restored to the public domain' remained in effect when the Reservation was finally opened by a presidential proclamation in 1905." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court found support for its view that the 1902 Act was the
operative statute for opening the Uintah Reservation in "subsequent presidential
proclamations, congressional acts, executive department orders, and court decisions."
Id. a t 13. These various documents all referred to the 1902 Act as the act which
authorized the allotment of tribal lands and the sale of surplus lands to non-Indians. Although essential to the Perank decision, this issue is beyond the scope of
this note and will not be examined in detail.
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viewed the statute for congressional intent to diminish the
reservation boundaries. The court listed several factors to determine whether Congress intended t o diminish the Uintah
Reservation but found it unnecessary t o look further than the
first and most probative factor-the language of the statutory
scheme.44 In concluding that Congress intended to diminish
the Uintah Reservation, the Perank court relied on several
United States Supreme Court cases which recognize that reservation boundaries are diminished by statutory language that
restores reservation lands t o the public domain.45The "operative statutory language" of the 1902 Act states that after members of the tribe are allotted their share of reservation lands,
"unallotted lands within said reservation shall be restored to
the public domain."46The Perank court found this language to
be persuasive evidence of congressional intent t o diminish the
Uintah Reservation.

IV. ANALYSIS
The conflict between the Perank court's decision and the
decision of the Tenth Circuit may yet be resolved by the United
States Supreme Court as a petition for certiorari has been filed
in a companion case.47The ramifications of the fmal outcome
are significant, especially for law enforcement in the disputed
area.48 With the current conflict between state and federal
case law, law enforcement officials face practical difficulties in
prosecuting the offenders for crimes which occur in the disput-

Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. a t 10.
44.
Id. a t 8-9 (discussing Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984); Rosebud Sioux
45.
Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S.
425 (1975); Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 US. 351
(1962)).
46.
Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 245, 263 (emphasis added).
47.
State v. Hagen, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (July 17, 1992), petition for cert.
filed, 1992 WL 166150 (Insta-cite) (U.S. Od. 15, 1992) (No. 92-6281); see also supra
note 1.
Two additional criminal cases turning on the issue of state jurisdiction in
48.
the disputed area were decided the same day a s Perank. See State v. Coando, 191
Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (July 17, 1992) (defendant convicted for issuing bad checks in
Roosevelt, Utah); State v. Hagen, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (July 17, 1992) (defendant convicted for distributing a controlled substance in Myton, Utah), petition for
cert. filed, 1992 WL 166150 (Insta-cite) (U.S. Oct. 15, 1992) (No. 92-6281). Four
mo&hs later the Utah Court of Appeals decided a case based on the Perank decision. See Roosevelt City v. Gardner, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Ct. App. Nov. 9,
1992) (defendant convicted of criminal mischief and unlawful possession and consumption of alcohol in Roosevelt, Utah).
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ed area of a reservation.
For example, if an Indian defendant is convicted under
state law for a burglary4' committed in the disputed area, he
could challenge the conviction. Under the federal court's interpretation of federal law establishing the reservation boundaries, the disputed area is Indian country and the state court
lacked jurisdiction. If the same Indian defendant committed the
same criminal act but is convicted under the federal Indian
Major Crimes
he could also challenge the conviction.
Under the state court's interpretation of federal law establishing the reservation boundaries, the disputed area is not Indian
country and the federal court lacked jurisdiction. Thus, law
enforcement officials need a clear delineation of state and federal jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has attempted to clarify the law in
this dimcult area. In Solem u. Bartlett,sl the most recent Supreme Court decision to address diminishment of reservation
boundaries, the Court articulated "a fairly clean analytical
structure" to differentiate allotment acts that diminished reservation boundaries from those that merely allowed non-Indian
settlers to own land within established reservation
b o ~ n d a r i e s This
. ~ ~ analysis is guided by the principle that only Congress can diminish the boundaries of a reservation and
that all individual parcels of land within a reservation retain
their reservation status, regardless of ownership, "until Congress explicitly indicates ~therwise."~
A corollary t o this principle is that Congress must "clearly evince an 'intent. . . to
change . . . boundaries' before diminishment will be found."54
The first factor to be considered in the Solem analysis is
the statutory language used to open the reservation lands for
sale to non-Indians. The Court emphasized the significance of
this factor, referring to it as "[tlhe most probative evidence of
congressional intent."55 Intent to diminish a reservation is
manifested when the statute makes "[elxplicit reference to
cession" or uses 'language evidencing the present and total

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

UTAHCODE ANN. 8 76-6-202 (1978).
18 U.S.C. $ 1153(a) (1988).
465 U S . 463 (1984).
Id. at 470.
Id. (citing United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909)).
Id. (quoting Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 615 (1977)).

Id.
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surrender of all tribal interest^."^" "almost insurmountable
presumption" of congressional intent to diminish a reservation
exists when the statutory language is coupled with "an unconditional commitment from Congress to compensate the Indian
tribe for its opened land."57
A second factor comes into play when the pertinent statute
does not contain explicit language of cession. It will be inferred
that Congress intended to diminish the reservation "[wlhen
events surrounding the passage of a surplus land act. . . unequivocally reveal a widely held, contemporaneous understanding that the affected reservation would shrink as a result of the
proposed legi~lation."~~
This factor focuses on "the manner in
which the transaction was negotiated with the tribes involved
and the tenor of the legislative Reports presented to Cong r e ~ s . "Nonetheless,
~~
additional evidence of congressional intent is demonstrated by its subsequent treatment of the affected areas and by the way agencies of the executive branch and
local judicial authorities dealt with the unallotted open lands.
The third factor focuses on who actually moved onto the
opened reservation lands. The Solem Court stated, "[wlhere
non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion of a reservation and the area has long since lost its Indian character, we
have acknowledged that de facto, if not de jure, diminishment
may have occurred."60 The following sections will analyze
these three factors as applied to the Uintah Reservation to
determine whether the Utah Supreme Court decision or the
Tenth Circuit decision is better reasoned. This note concludes
that the Utah Supreme Court decision more closely follows
federal precedent.

A. Statutory Language
The most probative evidence of congressional intent is the
language used in the legislation that opened the surplus lands
of the Uintah Reservation for non-Indian settlement." The
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id. at 471.
Id.
59.
60.
Id. De facto diminishment will not be used as the sole basis for finding
diminishment. If neither the act opening the reservation nor its legislative history
provide "substantial and compelling evidence of congressional intention to diminish
Indian lands," a court will hold that no diminishment occurred. Id. at 472.
61.
State v. Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 7 (July 17, 1992) (citing Solem, 465
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Utah Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit disagree as to the
significance of the statutory phrase "restored to the public
domain." In Perank the Utah Supreme Court correctly held
that this phrase, as used in the 1902 Act, established the necessary congressional intent t o diminish the boundaries of the
Uintah R e s e r ~ a t i o n .In
~ ~Ute Indian Tribe the Tenth Circuit
interpreted the phrase as it was used in the acts which opened
the Uncompahgre ReservationG3 and determined that the
phrase "mean[t] that Indian lands would be available for settlement, but that the boundaries [would] remain un~hanged.'"~
Relying in part on the fact that the phrase was
not accompanied by an unconditional commitment t o compensate the Indians for their lands, the Tenth Circuit concluded
that the phrase "restored to the public domain" did not indicate
congressional intent t o diminish the Uncompahgre Reservati~n.~~
However, case law does not require both cession language
and a statutory promise t o compensate the Indians with a sum
certain for their lands in order to establish that Congress intended to change reservation boundaries. The Supreme Court
has stated that when "language of cession is buttressed by an
unconditional commitment from Congress t o compensate the
Indian tribe for its opened land, there is an almost insurmountable presumption that Congress meant for the tribe's reservation to be dimini~hed."~~
Although a promise to pay the tribe a
fixed sum for its lands reinforces cession language as an expression of congressional intent, such a promise is not the sine
qua non. As the Perank court explained, "[nlo specific
talismanic statutory language is required t o conclude that Congress intended t o diminish a re~ervation."~'
U.S. a t 470).
62.
Id. at 13.
63.
The Tenth Circuit did not analyze the phrase as it applied to the Uintah
Reservation because it determined that the Uintah Reservation was opened by the
1905 Act alone and that the restoration language of the 1902 Act did not carry
through to the opening of the Uintah Reservation. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773
F.2d 1087, 1089 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. hnied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986).
64.
Id. at 1092.
65.
Id.
66.
Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1984).
67.
Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8 (citing Solem, 465 U.S. a t 471). The court
also explained that the statutory language need not "expressly sever tribal jurisdiction," "provide for unconditional compensation or a fixed sum to be paid to the
Indians," or "provide for Indian consent" in order to "effectuate a diminishment."
Id. (citations omitted).
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' UnitFor example, in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. K n e i ~ , ~the
ed States Supreme Court held that the language of the surplus
land acts opening the Rosebud Indian Reservation expressed
congressional intent to diminish the reservation boundaries
even though Congress had rejected a version of the act which
promised an outright fixed sum as compensation and instead
adopted a policy to pay the Indians for their lands only as money was received from the settler~.~%milarly,the acts opening
the Uintah Reservation did not guarantee a fixed sum as compensation for all of the lands opened to non-Indian settlement.
Instead the acts provided that the proceeds from the lands
actually sold t o homesteaders would be advanced t o the Indians
after the United States was reimbursed for expenses incurred
in effectuating the opening?'
In Perank, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "[sltatutory
language that opens reservation lands to public entry and
'restores' those lands to the 'public domain' has . . . been recognized in a number of Supreme Court cases to effectuate a diminishment of reservation boundaries as to such lands."71The
first of these cases, Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington
State ~enitentiary,~'
dealt with the status of the Colville India n Reservation. The Supreme Court stated that "[iln 1892, the
size of this reservation was diminished when Congress passed
a n Act providing that . . . about one-half of the original Colville
reservation, since commonly referred to as the 'North Half'

I t is undisputed that "cession-type language" manifests a congressional intent to
diminish. The Utah Supreme Court quoted, as an example, the key language from
DeCoteau v. District County Court where the Indians agreed to " 'cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest
in' " the disputed lands. Id. (quoting DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S.
425, 445 (1973). On the other hand, statutory language which merely "opens"
unallotted reservation lands to settlement by non-Indians is not sufficient to show
congressional intent to diminish the reservation. Id. (citations omitted).
68.
430 U.S. 584 (1977).
Id. at 587-88, 592.
69.
70.
Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 245, 264.
71.
Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8. In addition to the cases discussed in the
text, the Perank court also cited Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S.
317 (1942), which involved lands detached from the Sioux reservation by executive
order and "restored to the public domain." The Utah Supreme Court inferred that
"[aln implicit assumption of the opinion is that' the land restored to the public
domain was no longer subject to tribal jurisdiction and had been detached from the
Reservation." Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. a t 8. This case does little to bolster the
court's argument, however, because only Congress, not the executive branch, can
disestablish or diminish a reservation. Solem, 465 U.S. a t 470.
72.
368 U.S. 351 (1962).
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should be 'vacated and restored to the public domain.' "73Contrasting the 1892 Act with the 1906 Act which opened the
"South Half" of the reservation to non-Indian settlement, the
Seymour Court found no diminishment by the 1906 Act because
"[nlowhere in the 1906 Act is there t o be found any language
similar to that in the 1892 Act expressly vacating the South
Half of the reservation and restoring that land to the public
domain."74
In Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, the Court stated in dicta
that a portion of the Great Sioux Reservation had been terminated by an 1889 Act which "restored to the public" approximately one-half of the reservation lands.75 Justice Marshall
agreed with the majority on this point, asserting that the language of the 1889 Act was an example of "'clear language of
express terminati~n."'~~
The Court followed a similar approach in DeCoteau u. District County Court7?where it framed
the issue of diminishment as whether the reservation was "terminated and returned t o the public domain."78The DeCoteau
Court concluded that the 1891 Act in dispute-ratifying an
agreement for relinquishment of "all claim, right, title and
interest in and to all the unallotted landsn-terminated the
r e ~ e r v a t i o n In
. ~ ~support of this conclusion, the Court stated
that the 1891 Act was analogous t o the Act in Seymour "which
plainly 'vacated' and restored 'to the public domain' the northern portion of the Colville Re~ervation."~~

73.
Id. at 354 (emphasis added).
74.
Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
75.
430 U.S. 584, 589 & n.5 (1977) (citation omitted).
76.
Id. at 618 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481,
504 n. 22 (1973)).
77.
420 U.S. 425 (1975).
Id. at 426-27.
78.
79.
Id. at 427-28, 439 n.22.
80.
Id. at 449 (quoting Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary,
368 U.S. 351, 355 (1962)). However, restoration language is not evidence of intent
to diminish when the restoration language is not part of the operative language of
the statute. In Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984), the operative language of
the surplus lands act a t issue did not state that the unallotted lands would be returned to the public domain. The statute did, however, refer to the opened areas
as being in the "public domain." Solem, 465 U.S. a t 475. The Supreme Court recognized that this reference undisputedly supported the view that the statute diminished the reservation but held that because the reference was in an isolated phrase
it could not be dispositive. Id. at 474-75. The Perank court distinguished Solem on
the grounds that "[tlhe public domain language in Solem was located in an isolated
section of the Act, was used only in a descriptive manner, and did not purport to
restore any land to the public domain." State v. Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 8-9
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In light of these decisions it is somewhat surprising that
the Tenth Circuit held in Ute Indian Tribe that "the phrase
'restore t o the public domain' is not the same as a congressional
state of mind to dise~tablish."~'The Perank court responded
t o Ute Indian Tribe by noting that a more recent Tenth Circuit
8~
decision, Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Y a z ~ i e , had
"revisited the issue of the legal meaning of the phrase 'restore
to the public domain.' "83 The Yazzie court concluded:
[Flederal court cases reveal that neither Congress, the courts,
nor Indian tribes themselves have insisted that restoration
language be accompanied by more explicit cancellation language. Rather, they have used or accepted simple, operative
restoration language a s language of reservation termination
in many situations. We have found no case where operative
restoration language was not accepted a s language of termination.84

In Yazzie, the Tenth Circuit itself noted that the conclusion in
Ute Indian Tribe was "unexamined and unsupported in the
opinion.'"5

B. Surrounding and Subsequent Events
Even if the statutory language does not mandate diminishment, congressional intent to diminish may be inferred from
events surrounding the passage of the surplus land act. The
Perank court argued that the Uintah Reservation was opened
by the 1902 Act and that the operative language of that act
was precisely suited to diminishmed6 Since the express language is determinative of congressional intent, the court found
it unnecessary t o consider surrounding events in the context of
evidence of intent to diminish. Nevertheless, a review of surrounding and subsequent events shows some support of a finding of dimini~hment.~'
(July 17, 1992).
Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087, 1092 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
81.
(discussing the Uncompahgre Reservation), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986).
909 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990).
82.
83.
Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. a t 9.
84.
Yazzie, 909 F.2d at 1404.
Id. at 1400.
85.
Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. a t 10-13.
86.
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit in Ute Indian Tribe argued that the Uintah
87.
Reservation was opened exclusively by the 1905 Act which contained no restoration
language and went on to conclude that the events surrounding passage of the a d
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At first examation, the negotiations with the Ute Tribe do
provide some evidence of intent to disestablish. The 1902 Act
required the consent of the Indians before the reservation could
be allotted and the surplus lands opened for settlement." The
Act was amended in 1903 to allow the opening of the reservation without the Indians' consent, although their consent was
to be s ~ l i c i t e dInspector
.~~
James McLaughlin of the Bureau of
Indian Maim met with the Indians in the spring of 1903 to
obtain the consent requested but not required by the 1903
Act.g0He explained to the Indians: 'You say that line is very
heavy and that the reservation is nailed down upon the border . . . . [Blut Congress has provided legislation which will
pull up the nails which hold down that line and after next year

there will be no outside boundary line to this reservation.'"'
Inspector McLaughlin clearly spoke in terms of disestablishment. However, he reported to the Secretary of Interior that
the Indians were "unanimously opposed t o the opening of their
reservation under the provisions of the Act.'"' Thus there was
no agreement for Congress to ratify, and congressional intent
to diminish the reservation cannot be inferred from the negotiations with the tribe.
Subsequent actions and policies toward a particular reservation, including the way the surplus lands are treated by
Congress, the executive branch, and local judicial authorities,
might also be used to infer congressional intent.g3 In 1906
Congress extended the time for homesteaders to establish a
residence on opened lands and specifically referred to the
unallotted lands as "heretoforea part of the Uinta [sic] Indian
Re~ervation."~~
A 1912 Act also referred to the surplus lands
as "land which was formerly a part of the Uintah Indian Resdid not support a finding that the act disestablished or diminished the reservation.
Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087, 108849 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986).
88.
Act of May 27, 1902, ch. (388, 32 Stat. 245, 264.
89.
Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 994, 32 Stat. 982, 997-98.
90.
Id. See supra part 1II.A.
91.
Minutes of Councils Held by James McLaughlin, U.S. Indian Inspector, with
the Utah and White River Ute Indians a t Uintah Agency, Utah 42 (May 18-23,
1903), quoted in Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12 (emphasis added).
92.
Letter from James McLaughlin, United States Indian Inspector, to the Secretary of the Interior (May 30, 1903), reprinted in H.R. DOC.NO. 33, 58th Cong.,
1st. Sess. 8 (1903).
93.
Cf Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 471, 478 (1984) (contradictory treatment in legislative materials provides no guidance in determining intent).
94.
Act of January 27, 1906, ch. 7, 34 Stat. 9, 9 (emphasis added).
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ervati~n."'~
Two other acts, one in 1910 and one in 1911, referred to 'lands within the ceded Uintah Indian Reservati~n."'~These subsequent acts provide some evidence that
Congress considered the reservation boundaries diminished by
sale of the surplus lands.
In a 1905 Presidential Proclamation, President Theodore
Roosevelt declared that the unallotted lands in the Uintah
A 1906
Reservation "shall be restored to the public dorn~in."'~
Presidential Proclamation referred to "the former Uintah Indian Reservation in Utah" and declared that a small parcel of the
tribal grazing reserve was "restored to the public domain."g8
Action taken by the Secretary of Interior also provides evidence
of diminishment. In 1934 Congress authorized the Secretary "to
restore to tribal ownership the remaining surplus lands of any
Indian reservation heretofore opened."" The Secretary responded in 1945 by issuing an order that "added to and made a
part of the existing reservation" 217,000 acres of opened lands
which had been within the original Uintah Reservation boundaries.loOHad the reservation merely been opened for settlement rather than diminished, the status of these lands as part
of the reservation would not have been affected. By "adding"
these lands to the reservation the Secretary acknowledged that
they had once been removed from the reservation.
Although not dispositive, two examples of treatment of the
opened areas by local judicial authorities support a finding of
diminishment. Sowards u. Meagher,lol a case decided shortly
after the Uintah Reservation was opened, involved a dispute
over a filing for appropriation of water rights to irrigate reservation lands which had been opened for settlement. In
Sowards, the Utah Supreme Court took judicial notice that the
unallotted lands of the reservation had been "restored to the
public domain" by the 1902 Act.lo2 In United States v.
Boss,103the defendant was prosecuted for introducing liquor
Act of July 20, 1912, ch. 244, 37 Stat. 196, 196 (emphasis added).
95.
Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 210, 36 Stat. 1058, 1074; Act of April 4, 1910,
96.
ch. 140, 36 Stat. 269, 285 (emphasis added).
Proclamation of July 14, 1905, 34 Stat. 3119, 3119 (emphasis added).
97.
Proclamation of September 1, 1906, 34 Stat. 3228, 3228-29 (emphasis add98.
ed).
99.
Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 984.
100.
Order Notice, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,409 (1945).
101.
108 P. 1112 (Utah 1910).
102. Id. at 1114.
103.
160 F. 132 (D.Utah 1906).
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into Indmn country. The United States District Court for the
District of Utah dismissed the charges for lack of jurisdiction
because the alleged offense occurred on unallotted lands after
the opening of the reservation and was therefore not in Indian
country as required by the statute.lo4
The contemporaneous and subsequent treatment of the
unallotted opened lands by Congress, the executive branch and
local judicial authorities, while not dispositive, support a determination that the clear statutory language shows congressional purpose t o diminish.
C. De Facto Diminishment
On a pragmatic level, the Court has recognized that "who
actually moved onto opened reservation lands is also relevant
t o deciding whether a surplus land Act diminished a reservation."'" This is true, in part, because when an area is predominantly used o r populated by non-Indians, "finding that the
land remains Indian country seriously burdens the administration of state and local government."'" The recognition of the
actual state of things in determining whether a state may exercise jurisdiction over Indian territory has been consistently
recognized. As early as 1832, Justice McClean in a concurring
opinion asserted that "[ilf a tribe of Indians shall become so
degraded or reduced in numbers, as to lose the power of self
government, the protection of the local law, of necessity, must
be extended over them."lO' This same concept was reiterated
in Solem when the Court declared that diminishment may have
occurred when an "area has long since lost its Indian character."lo8
At the time Congress enacted the allotment policy and the
surplus land legislation, the common assumption was that
Indian reservations were a thing of the past. Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that, "[~Jonsistentwith prevailing wisdom, Members of Congress voting on the surplus land
104.
Id. at 134.
105.
Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 471 (1984).
106.
Id. at 471 n.12.
107.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 593 (1832) (McClean, J., concurring). Worcester is one of Chief Justice Marshall's trilogy of cases dealing with the
roots of federal Indian Law. The other cases in the trilogy are Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1 (1831). ,See CLINTON
ET AL., supra note 6, at 2-33.
108.
Solern, 465 U.S. at 471.
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Acts believed to a man that within a short timewithin a
generation at most-the Indian tribes would enter traditional
American society and the reservation system would cease to
exi~t."''~Thus, it would be reasonable to conclude that Congress intended diminishment and disestablishment by the
Dawes Act1'' and each accompanying surplus land act.
However, this conclusion does not end the inquiry because
of the federal government's trustee relationship with the Indians. This relationship leads to "the general rule that '[dloubtful
expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its
protection and good faith.' ""' As a result, a general intent to
terminate or diminish cannot be implied and every surplus
land act must be individually examined to ascertain congressional intent.
The clash between the goals of the allotment policy and
Congress's trustee responsibilities has created an enigma. Congress did not define reservation boundaries in the various surplus land acts because it believed that the reservations would
cease to exist; yet each act must be examined to determine
whether Congress intended the boundaries to change. Because
of the difficulties inherent in divining congressional intent in
this situation, de facto diminishment is a significant pragmatic
indicator of whether the boundaries of the reservation have
been duninished. Although "[rlesort to subsequent demographic
history is . . . an unorthodox . . . method of statutory interpretation, . . . in the area of surplus land Acts, where various
factors kept Congress from focusing on the dminishment issue,
. . . the technique is a necessary expedient."ll2
For example, in support of its finding that the Cheyenne
River Sioux Reservation had not been diminished, the Solem
Court noted that the opened area had not lost its Indian character.ll3 Very few homesteaders settled in the opened areas
and a strong tribal presence remained. At the time of the litigation, two-thirds of the enrolled members of the tribe lived in
the opened area and the seat of tribal government-where most

109.
Id. at 468.
110.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973) (quot111.
ing Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930)).
Solem, 465 U.S. at 472 n.13.
112.
113. Id. at 480.
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important tribal activities take place-was in the opened area.'I4
This situation can be contrasted with the Rosebud Sioux
Reservation. In Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip,ll5 the Court
held that the boundaries of the reservation had been diminished and recognized that the State of South Dakota had consistently exercised jurisdiction over the disputed area which
was "over 90% non-Indian, both in population and in land
Use.ffl 16
Thus, the area had lost its Indian character. Similarly, in DeCoteau u. District County Court,"' the Court held
that the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation had been terminated? The population of the former reservation consisted of
3,000 tribal members and 30,000 non-Indians.llg Only fifteen
percent of the original reservation land was owned in various
"Indian trust allotments" scattered randomly throughout nonIndian owned land.lzO
Although the United States Supreme Court has found this
to be an important factor, the possibility of de facto diminishment of the Uintah Reservation was not even addressed by the
Tenth Circuit and was relegated to a footnote in the Perank
decision.l2l The disputed area of the Uintah-Ouray Reservation has lost its Indian character. Approximately 18,000 nonIndians currently live in the area that the Perank court decided
had been disestablished.12' Only 300 Indians, not all of whom
are members of the Ute tribe, live in this same area? The
Ute Tribe has about 1,500 enrolled members, nearly all of
whom live on trust lands and not in the disputed area? The
tribal seat of government is located on trust lands at Fort
Duchesne.lz5The fact that the opened portion of the Uintah
Reservation has lost its Indian character is an important element weighing in favor of a finding of diminishment.

114.
Id.
115.
430 U.S. 584 (1977).
Id. at 605.
116.
117.
420 U.S. 425 (1975).
118.
Id. at 449.
119.
Id. at 428.
Id.
120.
121.
State v. Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 19 n.10 (July 17, 1992).
Id.
122.
123.
Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.; Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087, 1105 (10th Cir. 1985) (Seth,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986).
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The controversy over the exercise of state jurisdiction in
parts of the original Uintah Reservation was rekindled by the
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Perank. If the United States
Supreme Court decides to hear State v. Hagen,'% it is likely
to conclude that the reservation has been diminished. First, the
express language of the statute allotting lands to tribal members and opening surplus lands for settlement demonstrates
that Congress intended to diminish the reservation. The operative statutory phrase, "restore to the public domain," is clear
evidence that Congress intended to terminate the reservation
status of the lands which were thereby restored. Second, a
finding of diminishment is supported by contemporaneous and
subsequent treatment of the area by Congress, the executive
branch and judicial authorities, although these actions are too
ambiguous to be decisive. Third, the disputed lands have lost
their Indian character. De facto diminishment is a powerful,
practical reason that the state, rather than the tribe or the
federal government, should have jurisdiction over the disputed
area.
David R. Williams

126. 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (July 16, 1992), petition for cert. filed, 1992 WL
166150 (Instacite) (U.S. Od. 15, 1992) WO.92-6281).

